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Abstract
This paper analyzes credit risk transfer in banking. Speciﬁcally, we model loan sales and loan
insurance (e.g. credit default swaps) as the two instruments of risk transfer. Recent empirical
evidence suggests that the adverse selection problem is as relevant in loan insurance as it is in loan
sales. Contrary to previous literature, this paper allows for informational asymmetries in both
markets. We show how credit risk transfer can achieve optimal investment and minimize the social
costs associated with excess risk taking by a bank. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that no separation of
loan types can occur in equilibrium. Our results show that a well capitalized bank will tend to use
loan insurance regardless of loan quality in the presence of moral hazard and relationship banking
costs of loan sales. Finally, we show that a poorly capitalized bank may be forced into the loan
sales market, even in the presence of possibly signiﬁcant relationship and moral hazard costs that
can depress the selling price.
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The growth in credit risk transfer (CRT), and speciﬁcally, credit derivatives since the mid-
90s has been large. Instruments such as bank loans, once virtually illiquid, can now have their
risk stripped down and traded away. Indeed, how we view the role of banking institutions is
fundamentally changing.
The growth in credit derivatives is illustrated in ﬁgure 1, where we see that the notional out-
standing value has surpassed $12 trillion. Figure 2 is based on a survey of some of the largest
ﬁnancial institutions in the world. The average weekly trading volume for various derivative instru-
ments is reported. We see that credit derivatives have overtaken “plain vanilla” equity derivatives
in options activity for banks.
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) gave us our ﬁrst insight into how credit derivatives and loan sales can
coexist.1 The authors show how credit derivatives can help alleviate the “lemons” problem that
plagues the loan sales market and that it is possible that the introduction of credit derivatives could
shut down the loan sales market. This paper builds on Duﬀee and Zhou (2001), but departs from
it in two important ways. First, an assumption that is pivotal to their lemons result is that loan
insurance is used when no informational asymmetries exist between the bank and the potential
insurer. Recent empirical evidence by Acharya et al. (2005) suggests that banks are acting on their
privileged information in credit default swaps (loan insurance) markets. In their analysis, they ﬁnd
signiﬁcant information is revealed within these derivatives markets. This information revelation is
a tell-tale sign that banks are trading with asymmetric information that can give rise to adverse
selection. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to extend the Duﬀee and Zhou framework by
1A loan sale trades in the same way as the sale of any other type of asset: When a loan is sold, the future income
stream as well as all default risk is taken oﬀ the sellers books (note that we are not considering a situation where
the bank can make a contractual guarantee about the loan’s outcome, namely, we consider only loan sales without
recourse). Alternatively, in a loan insurance contract, the risk buyer agrees to cover the losses that take place if
pre-deﬁned events happen to the underlying ﬁrm. (In many cases, this event is the default of the underlying loan.
However, some contracts also include things like re-structuring as a triggering event). In exchange for this protection,
the risk shedder agrees to pay an ongoing premium. Therefore, the credit risk of the underlying loan is transferred
from the risk-shedder’s books, but the ownership of the loan still remains with its originator. The instrument we refer
to as loan insurance in this paper most closely resembles a credit default swap contract. As of mid-2005, single-name
credit default swaps accounted for two-thirds of all gross sold credit derivative positions (Fitch 2005).
1allowing for informational asymmetries in the credit default swap market. Second, Duﬀee and
Zhou (2001) assume that loan insurance is written on the ﬁrst period of a two period loan. This
assumption is restrictive too, because it implies a maturity mismatch.2 The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2005) found that supervisors penalize banks in terms of regulatory capital if
there is a maturity mismatch. There are even cases where this practice would yield no regulatory
capital relief at all. The new Basel II agreement formalizes what most supervisors are currently
doing by only allowing maturity mismatches in some cases, but reducing the regulatory capital
beneﬁt of the hedge in those instances (BIS 2005). Therefore, we analyze the consequences for the
credit derivatives (and sales) market when the insurance contract has the same maturity as the
underlying loan.3 The predictions of our model are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than Duﬀee and Zhou
(2001) and will be discussed below.
In this paper we look at how risk is disseminated in the banking sector. This sets this paper
apart from the work of others,4 who assume a structure of credit risk transfer, and analyze the
consequences for issues such as market liquidity and ﬁnancial stability. We begin by putting struc-
ture on the asymmetric information problem so that we can price our instruments.5 First, through
the unique relationship with their borrower, the bank may learn that a loan is of poor quality.
Second, there may be another investment available, which, when combined with the original loan,
may create a risk level that is unpalatable for the bank. We show how both loan sales and credit
derivatives can be used to achieve optimal levels of investment, while minimizing undue banking
risk. We seek to diﬀerentiate the two products within the banking environment by concisely deter-
mining under what conditions one is advantageous to the other, and when each can be sustained
in an equilibrium setting. We show that in equilibrium, no separation of types can occur. We
ﬁnd that two pooling equilibria can exist: one insurance and one sales. Determining when each
pooling equilibrium is unique, we ﬁnd that well capitalized banks will wish to exclusively use loan
insurance. Alternatively, banks who must utilize costly capital may need to turn to the loan sales
market, even when there are relationship management6 and moral hazard concerns that can depress
2A maturity mismatch introduces an example of an additional risk referred to as basis risk.
3Although the maturity of the contract is the same, the loan still belongs to the bank. The no maturity mismatch
rule we introduce simply allows the bank to trade all of the credit risk away, instead of just a timed portion of it.
4Excluding Duﬀee and Zhou (2001).
5This was not an issue in the Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) framework since the absence of asymmetric information in
the credit derivatives market yielded fully informed pricing.
6Relationship management refers to the unique bank-borrower relationship that is established through the course
2the selling price. By introducing these features of loan sales and loan insurance, our results diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from those of Duﬀee and Zhou (2001). Here, loan insurance is in direct competition
with loan sales, and the result is that it may or may not be optimal to use, depending on the
new factors we introduce. The fact that uniqueness of the two possible pooling equilibria can be
determined by the relative severity of costly capital to moral hazard and relationship management
costs constitutes the new predictions of our model, and the main contribution of this paper.
The intuition of our results is as follows. When the bank needs to reduce the risk in its
portfolio, it can decide whether to use loan sales or loan insurance. The risk buyer then prices
these contracts given the available information. If the perceived probability of default from the
risk buyers’ perspective is the same for both instruments, then a bank with a good loan would
prefer to use insurance, since it need only secure their initial investment, and the return remains
solely the bank’s. However, banks with bad loans have no incentive to truthfully reveal the quality
of their loan by using sales. Therefore, only a pooling insurance, or pooling sales equilibrium can
exist. We are left with identifying which pooling equilibrium will prevail. To do this, we extend
the previous analysis to the more realistic case in which capital is costly, and where moral hazard
and relationship banking issues are present in the bank-ﬁrm relationship. In this case, the results
get more complicated, but the intuition is clear. In loan sales, the bank will have little incentive to
continue to monitor the loan after a sale and could also lose some of the relationship it has built with
the underlying ﬁrm. In loan insurance, ties are maintained to the underlying loan so the incentive
to continue monitoring is greater. As well, the ﬁrm need not know that an insurance contract was
signed, so the relationship is aﬀected little. It is easy to see that if the relationship management or
moral hazard problems are severe, then the bank will have an incentive to use insurance regardless
of the loan quality. However, since insurance requires an upfront premium from the bank, whereas
sales does not, costly capital works in the opposite direction. If capital is particularly costly for
the bank, it may be optimal for the bank to use sales, regardless of loan quality.
The literature on credit risk transfer is small, but is growing. Gorton and Pennachhi (1995)
provide an early and fundamental discussion of the moral hazard that can arise in CRT. With loan
sales being the only instrument available in the model, they show how a bank can overcome the
moral hazard problem by continuing to hold a fraction of the loan, and oﬀering explicit guarantees
of a loan or loans.
3on loan performance. In this setting, the incentive of the bank to continue monitoring the ﬁrm
remains after the loan is sold. Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) extend the work of Gorton and Pennachhi
(1995) to analyze the consequences of introducing credit derivatives as an instrument of risk transfer.
This paper is most closely related to ours, in that they analyze loan sales and credit derivatives
together.
In recent work, Parlour and Plantin (2006) analyze credit risk transfer through the bank-
borrower relationship. Speciﬁcally, they use loan sales as their instrument of CRT and generate the
adverse selection problem by a bank that has a stochastic discount shock and can exploit proprietary
information. They analyze the case when a liquid CRT market can arise, and the socially ineﬃcient
outcome that may result. In contrast to their paper, we abstract away from the bank-borrower
relationship and focus instead on the bank-risk buyer interaction. Furthermore, whereas Parlour
and Plantin (2006) are concerned with when a liquid CRT market can arise, we restrict ourselves to
the parameter values for which it exists. We do this because we are interested in the eﬀects of both
sales and insurance CRT markets together, and not the existence of a single market. Wagner and
Marsh (2005) and Allen and Carletti (2006) model CRT in terms of loan sales to outside the banking
sector. Wagner and Marsh (2005) study the social impact of CRT analyzing cases where CRT itself
may not be eﬃcient. They argue that setting regulatory standards that reﬂect the diﬀerent social
costs of instability in the bank and insurance sector will be welfare improving. Allen and Carletti
(2006) show how a default by an insurance company can cascade into the banking sector causing a
contagion eﬀect when these two parties are linked through credit derivatives. What sets our paper
apart is that these works are only interested in the result of a CRT contract, but not in the contract
itself.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 analyzes the model in the
absence of CRT. Section 4 analyzes CRT in the base case with no externalities. Section 5 extends
the previous section on CRT to cases in which there is moral hazard, relationship management and
costly capital present. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude. The appendix can be found in Section 7
where the proofs to a number of propositions are contained.
42 The Model Setup
The model shares the following features with Duﬀee and Zhou (2001): There are three dates,
indexed as t = 0,1,2. There are three types of agents: a bank, a risk-taking counter parties (which
we will refer to as risk buyers) behaving competitively and a ﬁrm (or entrepreneur) requiring capital
for a project. The risk buying counter-party is risk neutral, while the bank, although maximizing a
linear proﬁt function will display risk aversion through an exogenous “regulation” parameter B to
be explained below. The ﬁrm will be modelled simply as a production technology that can generate
a ﬁxed return or fail.
At time t = 0, the ﬁrm (entrepreneur) requests L0 units of capital that yields a rate of return
to the bank of R0 > 1 if the ﬁrm’s project succeeds at time t = 2. The bank then chooses L ≤ L0;
we will discuss this choice further in section 3. The project is worth nothing if terminated at the
interim period, t = 1. There are two types of projects: high quality and low quality. We assume
there are half of each type of project in the economy, and a bank is assigned randomly to a project
at time t = 0. Deﬁne ph (pl) as the probability that a high (low) quality project defaults (and
returns zero), with 1 > pl > ph. We assume that the bank privately learns the quality of the
project at time t = 1. Without loss of generality, we normalize the risk free rate in the economy
to zero. We also assume that the projects have positive net present value (NPV) so that it makes
sense that the bank would take on such a loan. The bank is endowed with suﬃcient costless capital
to undergo all desired investments. We will depart from the Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) setup and
analyze the case of costly capital in section 5.2.
We add a new feature that Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) did not pursue by putting structure on the
adverse selection problem. This departure is needed so that the prices can diﬀerentiate the two
instruments to be introduced below. With no adverse selection in credit derivatives in Duﬀee and
Zhou (2001), this structure was not needed. Equivalent to Parlour and Plantin (2006), we add a
new investment opportunity that becomes available to the bank with probability q at time t = 1
that is private information to the bank. This investment has a return R1 > 1 at time t = 2 if it
succeeds but returns nothing with probability pN. L1 is required to be invested to pursue this new
project.7 This investment represents the dynamic nature of banking. The bank does not know
7Note that we can generalize this new investment to any concept that would make a bank wish to engage in CRT
regardless of loan quality. For instance, Parlour and Plantin (2006) use a private stochastic bank discount factor.
5what new opportunities will arise in the future when a loan is issued now. The fact that the risk
buyer cannot observe whether this new investment was available is not crucial to our results. We
discuss this further in section 4.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) cites two main reasons for the use of CRT
by banks: The ﬁrst is to free up credit to take on new business, while the second is to reduce risk
due to capital requirements. Both of these points are captured by the two reasons a bank uses CRT
in our model: Either they learn there is a new investment opportunity, and they need to shed loan
risk to pursue it (to be described in greater detail below), or they are exploiting private information
about the quality of the loan.
There is ample evidence that maintaining capital reserves is an important factor in banks’
decisions to engage in CRT. Pennacchi (1988) provides the argument that a prime incentive for
loan sales is to boost a bank’s capital ratio. Dahiya et al. (2003) ﬁnd empirically that most
banks that engage in CRT fall into the bottom quartile when ranked against all banks by tier 1
capital.8 Cebenoyan and Strahan (2002) ﬁnd more supporting evidence of the capital motivation of
CRT by directly showing that banks that sell their loans have less capital. To capture this capital
consideration in a reduced form, we assume that the bank suﬀers a cost of B > 0 if its losses exceed
some level, ˆ L. We will address the interesting case in which L0 < ˆ L, L1 < ˆ L, but L0 + L1 > ˆ L (so
a default of both loans causes this cost to be incurred). B is a loss that is unique to the banking
environment. Because of the nature of their business, falling below certain levels of capital can
be more costly for a bank than other types of institutions. We can interpret B in a couple ways.
Consider B being associated with an event that causes fragility or even default of a bank.9 As well,
B could represent simply a regulatory penalty for a bank falling below a pre-determined level of
capital. Justiﬁcation for the loss parameter B can be found in a number of places.
Turning to the process of credit risk transfer, a risk buyer can insure the bank against losses in
its original loan, or purchase that loan outright. Fitch (2005) reports that more than half of the
credit derivatives traded remain in the banking system, with the next highest going to the insurance
8Tier 1 capital refers to ﬁnancial capital considered to be the most reliable and liquid, equity being the most
prevalent example.
9We could also think of a the banks excess risk taking is instability of the system as a whole. One could argue
that the social cost to instability or failure in the banking sector is higher than it is with other types of ﬁnancial
institutions, because banks deal with the public, as in Wagner and Marsh (2005). Therefore, we could also think of
B as a means for the bank to internalize the externality they are causing on the ﬁnancial system.
6system, and the third highest to hedge funds. Because of this observation, we simply model the
risk buyer as any risk-neutral party, and give no characteristics that distinguish it as any one of
the three key players on the risk buying side. The risk buyer does not learn the quality of the ﬁrm
(while the bank does), and does not learn whether the new investment is available to the bank, but
knows they appear with probability q (alternatively, the risk buyer sees the new investment, but
is not able to determine if it is proﬁtable for the bank; rather, they have a prior belief that with
probability q, it is proﬁtable). Note that the ﬁrm only enters this model through a project that
needs funding. We will assume that the quality of the ﬁrm is only deduced through the bank-ﬁrm
relationship; therefore, whether the ﬁrm knows its type or not is irrelevant. We present the timing
of the model in the following ﬁgure.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
• Bank endowed with loan
• Bank chooses investment
level (L)
• Returns realized: R1, R2, or
default
• Contract claimed if necessary
• Bank learns of loan quality (high or
low)
• Bank learns if new investment avail-
able (prob q)
• Bank insures, sells, or does nothing
Figure 3: The timing of the Model
3 No CRT Available
We start with the benchmark case in which there are no CRT markets available. The following
lemma allows us to pinpoint what initial investment levels the bank will wish to pursue. Speciﬁcally,
the ﬁrm requests an investment of size L0 and the bank chooses an investment level L ≤ L0. For
simplicity, we will assume that if the initial investment is less than L0, the project still proceeds with
a return of R0 > 1.10 We will call the case in which L = L0 full (initial) investment. Accordingly,
10Our assumption of constant returns to scale is not restrictive. We could modify this to be decreasing returns to
scale so that the marginal return may go up when the project is underfunded. However, total proﬁt, and therefore,
total payment to the bank will go down. This is all that is required to get the results in the paper. Of course,
assuming increasing returns to scale would reinforce our results even more.
7L < L0 will be called under-investment. We begin with the following lemma that gives the optimal
investment strategy at time t = 1.
Lemma 1 Suppose the new investment is available at t = 1. The bank’s optimal investment
strategy at t = 1 is characterized as follows: (i) if full initial investment is pursued at t = 0, then




pNpl ) when the loan is
revealed as the high (low) type. (ii) If there is initial under-investment, the bank will always pursue
the new investment.
Proof. See appendix.
Interpreting the condition from this lemma is relatively straightforward. The numerator represents
the expected value of the new investment, conditional on it being available. We see that the lower
the probability of default of the new investment, the higher B can be and still maintain incentive
to pursue it (for a ﬁxed R1 and L1). We also see that the inequality is decreasing in the probability
of default of the high or low quality original loan. Alternatively, we can rearrange the condition to
pj ≤
R1L1(1−pN)
pNB , j = {h,l} and the interpretation is simply that the new investment is pursued
if and only if the old one is suﬃciently safe. We now turn to time t = 0 and ﬁnd the optimal
investment strategy.
Lemma 2
In equilibrium, the bank chooses L0 or ˆ L − L1 at t = 0.11
1. If B ≤
R1L1(1−pN)
pNpl , the bank will set L = L0 when L − (ˆ L − L1) ≥
qpNB(ph+pl)
R0[(1−ph)+(1−pl)], and
L = ˆ L − L1 otherwise.
2. If B >
R1L1(1−pN)
pNph , the bank will set L = L0 when L0 − (ˆ L − L1) ≥
2q(1−pN)L1R1
R0[(1−ph)+(1−pl)], and
L = ˆ L − L1 otherwise.




pNph ], the bank will set L = L0 when L0 − (ˆ L − L1) ≥
q(1−pN)L1R1−BpNpl
R0[(1−ph)+(1−pl)] , and L = ˆ L − L1 otherwise.
11In this second case, L is simply the level of initial investment such that, when combined with the capital needed
for the new investment, its maximum loses cannot exceed ˆ L.
8Proof. See appendix.
The ﬁrst part of lemma 2 follows from the discontinuity in the payoﬀ function over investment
choices.12 To interpret the second part of the lemma, we can re-write the condition in a more
intuitive way:
R0(L0 − (ˆ L − L1))[
1
2
(1 − ph) +
1
2
(1 − pl)] ≥ BqpN(ph + pl)
The left hand side is the return that the bank would forgo if it reduced its initial investment from
L0 to ˆ L − L1. The right hand side is the expected amount the bank would lose if it pursued full-
investment. If L0 − (ˆ L − L1) is small, this means that the initial investment need not be reduced
by much to avoid the cost of B. In this case, as long as B is not too big, the bank will ﬁnd it
advantageous to under-invest. Alternatively, when the left hand side is large, this means that the
bank must reduce its investment by a lot to avoid the cost of B. In this case, unless B is very small,
the bank will wish to invest fully. The third and fourth parts of the proposition can be re-arranged
and interpreted in a similar fashion.
We now look at the base case where CRT is available to the bank. We do this so that we can
enrich the model in section 5 to obtain our main results.
4 CRT Available
We now consider the case in which the bank pursues the initial investment fully, and can decide
whether to pursue the new investment. With the availability of credit risk transfer markets, the
risk buyer must price the loan sale or insurance premium, given the available information. The
bank will wish to engage in credit risk transfer (CRT) if either it learns that the loan is of low
quality, or the new investment becomes available. This can be assured by an assumption on B
that will derived and discussed in section 4.1. Given the available information, the risk buyer can
12We can generalize this by making B a decreasing function of L0. However, this would yield no further intuition
about our problem, thus we use the simplest setup possible.








We allow the bank to insure its initial investment, or sell the loan outright. Because of their zero
proﬁt condition (competitiveness assumption), the risk buyer must be indiﬀerent between insuring
and not insuring, as well as selling and not selling. We assume that the bank insures its initial
investment L,13 and therefore, the risk buyer will demand a premium of L0(
pl+qph
q+1 ). As well, the
risk buyer would be willing to buy this loan for R0L0(1−
pl+qph
q+1 ). The latter is simply the expected
payoﬀ of the loan from the risk buyer’s perspective.
If we relax the assumption that the risk buyer cannot observe the bank engaging in the new
investment, we see that the adverse selection problem will still be present so long as the new
investment is available. In this case, the risk buyer will use its prior beliefs to determine the
probability of default. In the case where the new investment is not available, the risk buyer will
know that the loan must be bad. However, in this paper, we are interested in the consequences for
the insurance and sales market when adverse selection is present, so we rule out this revealing case
by having the new investment be private information to the bank. Alternatively, we could assume
that the new investment is public information but it is always available and all the results to be
discussed would follow through.
4.1 Incentives to engage in CRT
In the previous section we outlined how the risk buyer would price a loan sale or insurance
premium under the information structure given. We now outline restrictions on the parameter
13This assumption parallels that of Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) where the bank insures only its initial investment. If
we allow the bank to insure less of their loan, i.e. partial insurance, this will not have any eﬀects on the qualitative
results of the paper, so long as the adverse selection problem is maintained. In other words, if the high type can
reveal itself by insuring less of the loan, and still be protected from the cost B, the adverse selection problem would
be solved. Since we have highlighted evidence that adverse selection is present in these markets, this paper will focus
only this case.
10space that will see the bank using CRT in the correct states. We assume that the bank invests
the entire amount requested (L0) in the initial investment. In Proposition 1 we will conﬁrm that
this level of investment will prevail in the presence of a CRT market. We begin by analyzing the
incentives to insure, and then repeat the exercise for sales.
4.1.1 Incentives to Buy Insurance
We start by verifying that the bank will wish to purchase loan insurance in the appropriate
states. We denote the state where a high (low) quality ﬁrm is realized as H (L), and the state
where the new investment opportunity is realized (not realized) as NEW (NONEW). Therefore
{H,NEW} represents a high quality ﬁrm and a new investment available.
It is easy to show that if the incentives are such that the bank insures in the high state, then
this implies they will insure in the low state. We therefore need to check two states: {H,NEW} to
make sure they wish to insure, and {H,NONEW} to make sure they do not wish to insure. Let
us analyze {H,NONEW} ﬁrst. Let πNI denote the bank’s payoﬀ from no insurance in the high
state, πI denote the payoﬀ from insurance in the high state, and PI denote the price per unit of
the insurance contract. We can consider the price PI to be the insurance premium.
πNI = R0(1 − ph)L0
πI = R0(1 − ph)L0 − PIL0 + phL0
From the above, for πNI ≥ πI, PI ≥ ph must hold. This condition will be a constraint in the
optimal contracting problem. We will refer to this condition as (I-Bound). We will assume that
this condition holds by putting it as a restriction in the optimal contracting problem to be set out
in section 4.3.
We now analyze {H,NEW} to see under what condition they will use loan insurance.
πNI = R0(1 − ph)L0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − phpNB
πI = R0(1 − ph)L0 − (PI)L0 + phL0 + (1 − pN)L1R1





Since PI ≥ ph, the R.H.S of (1) is positive, and therefore we place this restriction on B.
4.1.2 Incentives to Sell the Loan
We can conduct a similar exercise for loan sales. We begin by analyzing {H,NONEW}. Let
πNS denote the payoﬀ from no loan sales, and PS be the price per unit of a sales contract with a
net return on the underlying loan of 1.14
πNS = R0(1 − ph)L0
πS = R0(PS)L0
For πNS ≥ πS, PS ≤ 1−ph must hold. As in the insurance case, this condition will be a constraint
in the optimal contracting problem. We will refer to this condition as (S-Bound).
We now analyze {H,NEW} to see under what condition they will use loan sales.
πNS = R0(1 − ph)L0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − pNphB
πS = R0(PS)L0 + (1 − pN)L1R1
For πS ≥ πNS the following must hold:
B ≥
R0L0(1 − ph − PS)
phpN
(2)
Therefore, (2) is the parametrization that we make for loan sales. If we consider each market in
isolation, we get PI = Prob(Default|insurance) = Prob(Default|sales) = 1−PS. Therefore, one
can see that the only diﬀerence between (1) and (2) is a factor of R0. The reason for this diﬀerence
is intuitive when we look at how the two contracts are priced. Whereas the insurance premium
14PS is deﬁned in this way to ease the comparison of loan sales to loan insurance. Therefore, the total price of the
loan sale contract is R0L0PS.
12is independent of the return on the initial investment, the sales contract involves an entitlement
to the return in the future, and must depend on R0. If R0 is very high, B must also be high so
that in {H,NEW} the bank still has an incentive to use CRT. Therefore, we make the following
assumption so that CRT can arise.






The form of this assumption deserves some explanation. We allow the assumption to depend
on our two endogenous variables (PI and PS) because we are looking at the consequences of the
two CRT markets. In other words, we assume the existence of a CRT market for the equilibrium
price in which the risk buyer will earn zero proﬁt. The parameter space can always be chosen to
accomplish this.
4.2 CRT Available - Either Loan Sales or Loan Insurance (but not both)
Below, we will show the ex-ante expected payoﬀ equivalence of loan sales and loan insurance.
Because of this, we need only check one or the other to investigate under what conditions full
investment can arise. The case in which the bank does not use CRT and opts to reduce risk
exposure by under-investing is given in the appendix as equation (13). We can derive the expected
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R0L0(1 − ph) +
1
2
R0L0(1 − pl) + q[(1 − pN)L1R1] (3)
Equation (3) shows us that the expected payoﬀ to the bank is simply the expected return from
the initial loan (1
2R0L0(1−ph)+ 1
2R0L0(1−pl)) plus the expected return from the new investment
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1
2
)R0L0(1 − pl) + q[(1 − pN)L1R1] (4)
The equivalence of (3) and (4) has been established.
We are now equipped to show the main proposition of this section. The following proposition
analyzes the use of CRT and its eﬀect on investment choice.
Proposition 1 CRT is ex-ante more proﬁtable than without and yields the eﬃcient level of initial
and new investment.
Proof. See appendix.
From lemmas 2 and 1, it is straight-forward to see that the ex-ante expected loss due to B can
be eliminated by either investing in CRT in both states of the world, or under-investing.
4.3 Both markets available - Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept we apply is that of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE). Given As-
sumption 1, there are only two equilibria that can prevail when both CRT markets are open at the
same time. The ﬁrst equilibrium is where all types use loan insurance, while the second is where all
types use loan sales. We ﬁrst verify that a separating equilibrium cannot exist, and then proceed
to see which pooling equilibria can be sustained.
4.3.1 Non-existence of Separating Equilibria
From proposition 1, we know that full initial investment dominates under-investment. For what
follows, we will assume that the conditions of lemma 1 are satisﬁed so that the bank prefers to
14invest in the new investment when it is available. Checking both {L,NONEW} and {L,NEW} is
redundant. First, the participation constraint on {H,NEW} is a stronger condition than either of
the participation constraints for the low types. As well, the new investment will yield the same
additional payoﬀ in both sales and insurance, so the one incentive constraint is redundant.15 Finally,
assumption 1 guarantees that the bank will not wish to use CRT in the state {H,NONEW}. Thus,
we need only check {L,NONEW} and {H,NEW}.
Consider ﬁrst a separating equilibrium where a bank with type high (low) type loans chooses
to insure (sell). Given the information structure of this separating equilibrium, we know that
Prob(Default|insurance) = ph and Prob(Default|sales) = pl. We can show that this equilibrium
cannot exist simply by looking at the incentive constraint on the low type (IC1 - which says that
the low type wishes to use sales over insurance) as well the two zero proﬁt conditions. The optimal
prices (PI,PS) must satisfy the following:
R0L0(PS) ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 − L0PI + plL0 (IC1)
L0(PI − ph) = 0 (zero-πI)
R0L0[(1 − pl) − PS] = 0 (zero-πS)
By (zero-πI) and (zero-πS), we can see that the only candidate prices are PI = ph and PS =
1 − pl. We can quickly verify that under these prices, (IC1) cannot hold:
(1 − pl)R0L0 ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 − L0ph + L0pl
⇒ ph ≥ pl
Since pl > ph, (IC1) is violated. Therefore, this separating equilibrium cannot be supported. We
can also verify that the separating equilibrium where banks with high quality loans sell, and banks
15To see this, consider the participation constraints in the state {L,NEW}: (1 − pl)R0L0 − L0PI + plL0 + (1 −
pN)L1R1 ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − plpNB which simpliﬁes to: plL0 − l0PI ≤ plL0 + plpNB. Now consider
the participation constraint on {H,NEW}: (1 − ph)R0L0 − L0PI + phL0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 ≥ R0L0(1 − ph) + (1 −
pN)L1R1 − pNphB which simpliﬁes to: phL0 − l0PI ≤ phL0 + phpNB. Since ph < pl it is obvious that if the
participation constraint on {H,NEW} binds, the participation constraint on {L,NEW} will automatically bind. To
see the redundancy in the incentive constraints, consider the incentive constraint where {L,NEW} wishes to use sales
over insurance: R0L0(PS) + (1 − pN)L1R1 ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 − L0PI + plL0 + (1 − pN)L1R1. However, this simpliﬁes
to: R0L0(PS) ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 − L0PI + plL0 which is the incentive constraint on {L,NONEW}. This reasoning also
applies if we are looking at the low type using insurance over sales. Therefore, only one of the incentive constraints
on the low type is needed.
15with low quality loans insure cannot be supported. The proof is very similar to the above and is
omitted. The separating equilibria above are ruled out because the risk buyer is forced to earn
zero proﬁt in each market. Allowing them to subsidize one market by over-charging in the other
will give rise to one separating equilibrium: a bank with high type loans will use insurance, and
low type loans, sales. We pursue this case after we have ﬁnished analyzing the case in which the
risk buyer must earn zero proﬁt in each market. Any separating equilibrium where a type does not
engage in CRT is ruled out by assumption 1.
4.3.2 Pooling Equilibrium with Insurance
We proceed by showing there are two possible pooling equilibria. Consider ﬁrst the case where
banks that have either high or low quality loans both choose to insure. Given the information
structure in this pooling equilibrium, we know that Prob(Default|insurance) =
pl+qph
q+1 . In this
case we will have two participation constraints (I-PC1, I-PC2 - ensuring the bank with either the
low or high type loans wishes to engage in CRT) and two incentive constraints (I-IC1, I-IC2 -
ensuring that the bank with either the low or high type loans wish to use insurance over sales).16
We can characterize the optimal prices (PI,PS) as follows:
(1 − pl)R0L0 − L0PI + plL0 ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 (I-PC1)
(1 − ph)R0L0 − L0PI + phL0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 ≥ R0L0(1 − ph) + (1 − pN)L1R1 − pNphB (I-PC2)
(1 − pl)R0L0 − L0PI + plL0 ≥ R0L0(PS) (I-IC1)




) = 0 (zero-π)
PI ≥ ph (I-Bound)
PS ≤ 1 − ph (S-Bound)
From (zero-π), we can see that the only admissible insurance premium is PI =
pl+qph
q+1 . At this
price, (I-PC1) is satisﬁed, while (I-PC2) is satisﬁed by assumption 1.
16Recall that we need not check both the low type with and without the new investment as it is redundant.
16From (I-IC1), we ﬁnd:




Next, from (I-IC2), we ﬁnd:




Since R0 > 1, q ∈ (0,1) and pl < ph, it follows that (5)⇒ (6). Therefore, (5) deﬁnes the price
range that can be assigned to loan sales to sustain this pooling equilibrium, and represents the
oﬀ-the-equilibrium path beliefs that the risk-buyer assigns to the sales market that can support
this pooling equilibrium.17 It is easy to see that (I-Bound) and (S-Bound) are satisﬁed at the
admissible values of PI and PS. Henceforth, if this equilibrium exists, we will refer to it as the
insurance equilibrium.
4.3.3 Pooling Equilibrium with Loan Sales
We continue by shifting our focus to the pooling equilibrium where both high and low types
chose loan sales. We know Prob(No Default|CRT) = 1−Prob(Default|CRT) = 1−
pl+qph
q+1 . The
optimal prices (PI,PS) must satisfy:
PSR0L0 ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 (S-PC1)
PSR0L0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 ≥ R0L0(1 − ph) + (1 − pN)L1R1 − pNphB (S-PC2)
PSR0L0 ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 − LPI + plL (S-IC1)




− PS = 0 (zero-π)
PI ≥ ph (I-Bound)
PS ≤ 1 − ph (S-Bound)
17Note that equilibrium reﬁnements like the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion have no bite in this setting (and in
all equilibria to be shown in this paper). Therefore, we are able to focus on all oﬀ-the-equilibrium path beliefs that
sustain the pooling equilibrium.
17From (zero-π), we can see that PS = 1 −
pl+qph
q+1 . Given this, it is easy to verify that (S-PC1) is
satisﬁed. As well, (S-PC2) is satisﬁed by assumption 1. Plugging the value for PS into (S-IC1)
yields:
PI ≥ pl − R0[
q
q + 1
(pl − ph)] (7)
Plugging PS into (S-IC2) yields:
PI ≥ ph + R0[
q
q + 1
(pl − ph)] (8)
Since R0 > 1, it follows that (8)⇒(7) and therefore, the insurance premium can take on any
value in the range deﬁned by the oﬀ-the-equilibrium path beliefs, (8). With the oﬀ-the-equilibrium
path beliefs being deﬁned by (8), we can assign an upper bound as: PI ≤ pl. This restriction must
hold because of the zero proﬁt condition of the risk buyer.18 Thus, R0 ≤
q+1
q must hold for this
pooling equilibrium to exist. We can see that if a project has a large return, then the bank will
turn to the loan insurance market. It is easy to see that (I-Bound) and (S-Bound) are satisﬁed at
the admissible values of PI and PS. Henceforth, if this equilibrium exists, we will refer to it as the
sales equilibrium.
Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) conclude that if a sales market exists, and a loan insurance market is
introduced, pooling in the sales market may no longer be possible. This in turn would cause the
break down of the sales market altogether. Since Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) have insurance being
written on a portion of the loan with no adverse selection, they show that the sales market can
break down because of the ﬂexibility of loan insurance. Our model produces a similar result without
the ﬂexibility in insurance, but from an entirely diﬀerent channel. Since the sales market can exist
in isolation with R0 >
q+1
q , if insurance is introduced under these circumstances, pooling in the
sales market would not be possible. This would cause the sales market itself to break down.
All other equilibria can be ruled out in essentially the same way as was done above so the proofs
are omitted.
We are now ready to analyze an enriched version of the model so that we can derive our main
18The reason for this is that if the bank is charged more than pl for insurance, they would necessarily make positive
proﬁt since pl is the highest probability the loan can default with.
18results.
5 Moral Hazard, Relationship Management, and Costly Capital
One important point about having multiple equilibria is that there is no way of telling which will
occur. This non-uniqueness stems from the fact that we have left key attributes of each instrument
unmodelled thus far. Enhancing the model to a more realistic setup will give us insight into the
choice of insurance versus sales. First, the relationship between a bank and a borrower can cause
a moral hazard problem to develop. Consider a bank that has a special technology to verify that
the ﬁrm is operating in a manner that is in keeping with the bank’s interests. We refer to this as a
monitoring technology. When the bank transfers away risk from a loan, it may no longer have the
incentive to invest in this monitoring technology. In this paper, we do not analyze the origins of
the moral hazard problem, but rather, we analyze the eﬀect of its presence. For a review of moral
hazard in banking, see for instance Gorton and Pennachhi (1995).
The second issue with CRT arises only with loan sales. In a loan sale, the underlying ﬁrm and
new lender must expend resources to build a new relationship which can devalue the loan. We will
refer to this cost as relationship management. In reality, the cost of selling a loan could go farther
than just a devaluation of the current loan, as it could hurt future business with the underlying
ﬁrm.19 In some loan sale contracts, the underlying ﬁrm may even try to prevent a bank from selling
their loan by specifying a no-sale stipulation. The costs associated with relationship management
are not generally applicable to loan insurance because the originating bank maintains ownership
of the loan and need not inform the underlying ﬁrm of their intent to insure. It has been shown
empirically that these costs are present in loan sales. Dahiya et al. (2003) ﬁnd that when a bank
sells a loan, the market reacts negatively to it by devaluing the bank’s stock.20 With moral hazard
and relationship management costs, conditions can be set so that the bank strictly prefers loan
insurance in all states or vice versa. Moral hazard and relationship management will be analyzed
in Section 5.1.
In Section 5.2, we relax the assumption that capital comes without cost. Realistically, banks
19We will not model this channel here.
20This evidence may also incorporate the adverse selection problem discussed before.
19have investors who provide capital, but who expect a rate of return on their investment.21 Compet-
itiveness in the banking sector will provide us with diﬀerent cost structures for sales and insurance.
We will see that this addition has the possibility of making loan sales attractive to a bank who
must acquire relatively costly capital.
The introduction of these two unique features are two of the contributions this paper makes to
the literature. Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) does not consider the possible trade-oﬀs between sales and
insurance on these grounds. We will see that the addition of these two costs drives the equilibrium
choice between sales and insurance, whereas Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) could make no such direct
comparison.22
5.1 Moral Hazard and Relationship Management Costs
To consider the possibility that there are additional costs to using loan sales, we add an exoge-
nous cost parameter α ∈ [0,1]. This new parameter represents the degree to which the project is
worth less in the hands of the risk buyer due to both the moral hazard problem of the bank and
the relationship management cost incurred by the risk buyer. When α is low, the costs associated
with selling are high, and the bank must take a signiﬁcantly lower price for the loan sale if it wishes
to pursue this instrument of CRT. For simplicity, we assume that moral hazard and relationship
eﬀects are not present in loan insurance; however, the qualitative results will follow through if we
allow for moral hazard in the loan insurance market. However, since the originating bank is still
tied to the return of the loan, we would expect moral hazard to be smaller with loan insurance.
This argument will be formalized below when we show how moral hazard can be endogenized in
the model. If we consider a diﬀerent setting where the bank maintains no ties to the return on the
loan (i.e it insures both the principal and the return), then the moral hazard problem would be the
same in insurance as in sales. However, α would still be larger for loan insurance because of the




R0L0[1 − ph(1 − q(1 − α))] +
1
2
R0L0(1 − αpl) + q[(1 − pN)L1R1]
21We will not analyze the choice between investor and depositor ﬁnancing for the bank in this paper. We simply
assume a rate of return that a bank must pay on any capital it uses.
22Recall that Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) diﬀerentiated sales and insurance through a maturity mismatch, which this
paper contends is no longer a driving feature of these markets.
20Not surprisingly, the expected proﬁt from loan sales is unambiguously lower than that of loan
insurance (as determined in (3)) when α < 1. This result already gives us the intuition behind
what will be the equilibrium outcome. Our main result, Proposition 3 will conﬁrm that the smaller
is α, the less likely it is that sales can be sustained in equilibrium.
It is important to recognize that this reduced form representation of moral hazard can be
generated endogenously in an extension to the model. In Appendix B (section 7.2) we show that
little is lost by assuming that moral hazard imposes an exogenous cost on the price of loan sales.
5.2 Costly Bank Capital
In this section, we generalize the previous exercises with the more realistic assumption that
bank capital may come at a cost. An important question to ask is what would cause a bank to have
diﬀerent costs of capital? One key factor is how well capitalized a bank is. Investors in the bank
will be willing to accept lower rates of return if the bank has suﬃcient equity to cover potential
loss in case of default. If the bank is poorly capitalized, the risk to the investor is greater, and they
will charge a greater amount representing the extra risk they must bear. However, we assume that
the risk-buyer is not under this type of constraint.23 Therefore, we assume that the risk buyer is
not subjected to this cost of capital. This assumption can be relaxed so that the risk buyer does
have a cost, but it is less than that of the bank.
Let there be two investors in the bank, an early investor, and a late investor. The early investor
is endowed with unlimited capital at time t = 0, but none at times t = 1,2. We represent their
preferences as in Allen and Gale (2005) with the following risk-neutral utility function:
U(c0,c1,c2) = (Rf − 1)c0 + c1 + c2
where Rf − 1 represents the rental rate of capital and ct is the consumption at time t. One of
the key insights from the functional form is that investors are indiﬀerent between consumption at
t = 1 and t = 2. Because of this, they will require the same return, Rf − 1 > 0, regardless of how
long they loan the capital to the bank. The late investor is endowed with unlimited capital at time
23This assumption is justiﬁed given our assumption that the risk buyer is well diversiﬁed.
21t = 1, but none at time t = 2. We represent their utility function as:
U(c0,c1,c2) = (Rf − 1)c1 + c2
This type of investor simply gives capital at time t = 1 and requires a return of Rf − 1 at
time t = 2. Note that we have equalized the outside opportunity cost of each investor type for
simplicity.24 The rental rate of capital deserves some explanation. We use a rental rate to be
consistent with the base case where the bank owns its own capital (Rf = 1). Alternatively, we
could modify the base case so that the bank does not own its capital, but need not pay a return on
it. The results do not change with either way of treating the capital cost. Therefore, we assume the
bank will return the principal after the ﬁnal date, but for simplicity, and without loss of generality,
we normalize the principal to zero.
We now turn to the expected (ex-ante) proﬁt for the bank. Recall we derived the expressions (3)
and (4) earlier without costly capital. We can calculate the new expected costs of this additional





(1 − q)(Rf − 1)L0 + q[(Rf − 1)L0 + (Rf − 1)L0PI + (Rf − 1)L1] +
1
2
(1 − q)(Rf − 1)L0




(1 − q)(Rf − 1)L0 + q[(Rf − 1)L0 + (Rf − 1)(L1 − R0L0(PS))] +
1
2
(1 − q)(Rf − 1)L0
= (Rf − 1)(L0 + qL1) − (Rf − 1)qR0L0PS
We can see that insurance is unambiguously more costly than sales. Therefore, loan sales
yields more proﬁt (ex-ante) than loan insurance under costly capital without moral hazard and
relationship costs (i.e α = 1). The intuition behind this result is that loan insurance forces the
bank to obtain even more costly capital to engage in CRT ((Rf − 1)qL0PI). At the same time,
loan sales allows them to free up capital (and reinvest the payoﬀ from the sale) when they wish to
pursue the new investment (−(Rf − 1)qR0L0PS).
24We have also assumed that the two types of investors cannot trade with each other.
22We will see that the intuition of the previous analysis is conﬁrmed in Proposition 3, where we
show that the higher is Rf, the less likely it is that insurance can be sustained in an equilibrium
setting.
5.3 Moral Hazard, Relationship Management, and Costly Capital Together
A similar exercise to that of section 4.1 can give us the following assumption that permits
the existence of our CRT markets in our generalized framework. The derivation can be found in
Appendix C (section 7.3).





We begin by ruling out all separating equilibria in this generalized setting.
Proposition 2 No separating equilibria can exist in the generalized model where α ∈ [0,1) and
Rf < 1.
Proof. See appendix.
Let us now consider the insurance pooling equilibrium where banks with both high and low type
loans choose to insure. To diﬀerentiate, given the knife-edge case where the incentive compatibility
constraints hold with equality, we assume they choose insurance. This will make our incentive
compatibility constraints in the sales equilibrium case strict. It can be shown that the incentive
and participation constraints of the state {H,NEW} are implied by those in state {L,NEW} so we
drop them. In what follows, we assume that the bank wishes to pursue full investment, as we did
23in the simpler case of the previous section. The optimal prices (PI,PS) are given by:
(1 − pl)R0L0 + plL0 − (Rf − 1)L0 − RfPIL0 ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 − (Rf − 1)L0 (I-PC1)
(1 − pl)R0L0 + plL0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − (Rf − 1)L0 − RfPIL0 − (Rf − 1)L1 ≥ (I-PC2)
(1 − pl)R0L0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − (Rf − 1)L0 − (Rf − 1)L1 − pNplB
(1 − pl)R0L0 + plL0 − (Rf − 1)L0 − RfPIL0 ≥ αR0L0(PS) − (Rf − 1)L0 (I-IC1)
(1 − pl)R0L0 + plL0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − (Rf − 1)L0 − RfPIL0 − (Rf − 1)L1 ≥ (I-IC2)









αPS ≤ 1 − ph (S-Bound)
On the left hand side of (I-IC1) and (I-IC2), we see that with insurance, the bank holds the
investment for two periods, and incurs a cost of (Rf − 1)L. As well, they borrow an additional
L0PI for one period to pay for the cost of insuring, and incur a cost of RfL0PI.
On the right hand side of (I-IC1) and (I-IC2), the cost of capital for loan sales deserves some
explanation. The bank acquires the capital for the initial loan at a cost of (Rf − 1)L. At time
t = 1, they need not borrow the full amount of capital for the new investment. This is because
they can reinvest the proceeds of the loan sale. The cost of the extra capital that is needed for the
new investment is (Rf −1)[L1 −αR0PSL0]. For simplicity we assume that L1 ≥ αR0PSL0.25 This
assumption is innocuous since we will soon see that our characterizing solutions do not depend on
L1.
Given (zero-π), we know that PI =
pl+qph
q+1 . (I-PC1) is satisﬁed when Rf ≤
pl
PI, while (I-PC2) is
implied by assumption 2. PS is given by the oﬀ-the-equilibrium path beliefs of the risk buyer and
25This assumption is equivalent to the assumption that the bank has a storage technology with a return of 1.
24can be deﬁned given α and Rf. We obtain the following parameterizations for (I-IC1) and (I-IC2):
α ≤




R0(1 − pl) − RfPI + pl
R0PSRf
(I-IC2a)
Since (I-IC1a) and (I-IC2a) diﬀer by a fraction 1
RF , it follows that (I-IC2) ⇒ (I-IC1). Therefore,
(I-IC2) is binding, while (I-IC1) is slack. We can use a standard approach to ﬁnd out when this
equilibrium cannot exist. We let the oﬀ-the-equilibrium path beliefs be PS = 1 − pl. Therefore, if
the equilibrium cannot exist under this condition, it cannot exist for any valid oﬀ-the-equilibrium
path belief. Substituting PS = 1 − pl into (I-IC2) yields this range:
α >
R0(1 − pl) − RfPI + pl
R0(1 − pl)Rf
We continue by analyzing when the equilibrium can exist.
Lemma 3 The insurance equilibrium exists whenever one of the following two conditions is met
1. α <
PI(1−pl)









The results of this Lemma are relatively straight-forward. The ﬁrst condition says that if α is
small, then the insurance equilibrium will exist when Rf (low cost of capital) is suﬃciently small.
The second condition says if α is larger, we will require an even smaller value of Rf than what was
required in the ﬁrst condition.
We can conduct a similar exercise for the sales equilibrium. The participation and incentive
constraints of state {L,NEW} are implied by those of state {H,NEW} and are dropped. The
25following setup will yield the optimal prices (PI,PS):
αPSR0L0 − (Rf − 1)L0 ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 − (Rf − 1)L0 (S-PC1)
αPSR0L0 − (Rf − 1)L0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − (Rf − 1)[L1 − (αRPSL0)] ≥ (S-PC2)
(1 − ph)R0L0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − (Rf − 1)L0 − (Rf − 1)L1 − pNphB
αPSR0L0 − (Rf − 1)L0 > (1 − pl)R0L0 + plL0 − (Rf − 1)L0 − RfPIL0 (S-IC1)
αPSR0L0 − (Rf − 1)L0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − (Rf − 1)[L1 − (αRPSL0)] > (S-IC2)









αPS ≤ 1 − ph (S-Bound)
From (zero-π) we know that PS = 1 −
pl+qph
q+1 . (S-PC1) holds when α ≥
1−pl
PS , while (S-PC2) holds
by assumption 2. PI is given by the oﬀ-the-equilibrium path beliefs of the risk buyer and can be
deﬁned given α and Rf. We can ﬁnd a parametrization in terms of α for (S-IC1) and (S-IC2):
α >




R0(1 − ph) + ph − RfPI
RfR0PS
(S-IC2b)
Using the same method as in the insurance case, we can determine when the sales equilibrium
cannot exist. By substituting PI = pl as the oﬀ-the-equilibrium path belief into (S-IC1b) and
(S-IC2b), we can obtain the range for which sales cannot exist (if either one of the following two
conditions are met):
α ≤




R0(1 − ph) + ph − Rfpl
RfR0PS
(10)
The following Lemma gives the formal conditions for when the sales equilibrium exists.
26Lemma 4 The sales equilibrium exists whenever one of the following three conditions is met
1. α ≥
1−pl







PI+R0PS < Rf ≤
R0(1−ph)+ph







PI < Rf ≤
pl






The ﬁrst condition says that so long as α and Rf are suﬃciently high, then this equilibrium
can exist. The second two conditions simply say that if we force α to be even higher than the
ﬁrst condition, then we can sustain this equilibrium for lower costs of capital (smaller values of
Rf).26 When we combine this Lemma with that of Lemma 3, Proposition 3 will show that the
bank will tend to rely on loan insurance when α is low or Rf is close to one. For example, it
could be that banks are well capitalized and/or the moral hazard or relationship banking concerns
are troublesome in the loan sales market. When α is low and Rf is high, both markets may not
exist. By assumption 2, we can rule out the case where a bank with one type of loan wishes not
to participate. We can ﬁx this idea by deﬁning a particular oﬀ-the-equilibrium path belief in each
of these two equilibria. In the insurance case, we set PS = 1−
pl+qph
q+1 , and for the sales case we set
PI =
pl+qph
q+1 . The following proposition shows under this oﬀ-the-equilibrium path belief, the choice
between insurance and sales is unique.
Lemma 5 Under the oﬀ-the-equilibrium path beliefs assigned, the equilibrium is uniquely deter-
mined by Rf and α as either insurance, sales or neither.
Proof. See appendix.
We can now give our main result of the section. The following Proposition states that when cap-
ital is relatively cheap, then the insurance equilibrium can be supported for when there is suﬃcient
moral hazard/relationship management costs. Conversely, when the moral hazard/relationship
26Note that in the second two conditions, one must be careful as the the lower bound on Rf cannot be smaller
than 1.
27management costs are low, the sales equilibrium can be supported for suﬃciently high costs of cap-
ital. The proof of this Proposition follows easily from Lemmas 3 and 4. We can obtain uniqueness
of the equilibrium from Lemma 5.
Proposition 3
1. When the cost of capital is low, the bank will use insurance when α is suﬃciently small.
2. When the costs of moral hazard/relationship management are low, the bank will use sales
when Rf is suﬃciently high.
The reason for this result has been discuss earlier, but will be reiterated for clarity. The bank
may choose sales over insurance when the cost of capital is high because insurance requires an
upfront payment, whereas sales frees up capital immediately. Conversely, since the moral hazard
and relationship management problems will tend to be worse for loan sales, the bank will use
insurance when these costs are high.
The results of this paper show that by introducing adverse selection into the insurance market,
the Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) framework changes quite a bit. In Duﬀee and Zhou (2001), the existence
of the sales equilibrium versus the insurance equilibrium was driven by the timing of the model,
and the speciﬁc informational assumption on loan insurance. In this model, by relaxing these two
key assumptions (which we discuss why they may be unrealistic), we derive properties of a bank
(or loan) which can determine whether sales or insurance would be used.
6 Conclusion
We use a model where CRT arises because of two factor: ﬁrst, a bank can use CRT to dump
low quality loans, and second, a bank can use CRT when its total risk exceeds a pre-determined
level. We show that in the basic setup with no moral hazard or relationship management costs,
only an insurance or sales pooling equilibrium can exist. To determine the conditions under which
either equilibrium can be the unique outcome, we extend the model to allow for costly capital,
moral hazard and relationship banking issues. We ﬁnd that well capitalized banks will use loan
insurance in the presence of moral hazard and relationship costs of loan sales. Finally, we show
28that if the bank is poorly capitalized, so that capital is very costly, they may be forced into the
loan sales market even in some cases where the loan sale price could be signiﬁcantly depressed.
297 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Conditional on the bank pursuing full initial investment, we can consider the two states in which
the bank may want to avoid investment in the new project separately: {H,NEW} and {L,NEW}.
We begin by looking at {H,NEW} and ﬁnding the range of B where the bank will wish to pursue
the new investment:





We now derive the condition for full new investment in the state {L,NEW}:





Because pl > ph (12) ⇒ (11), and thus (12) is the only parametrization needed to ensure the new
investment is pursued when it is available.
If the bank does not pursue full initial investment, then it must always be optimal to pursue the
new investment since it has positive expected return, and the possibility of the loss B has already
been eliminated. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2
For the ﬁrst part of the proposition, consider investing L ∈ (ˆ L − L1,L0). This investment is
strictly dominated by L = L0 since the project is of positive net present value (NPV), and by
investing L ∈ (ˆ L − L1,L0), you are still subjected to the possibility of the loss, B. Next, consider
the case in which L < ˆ L − L1. This investment level is strictly dominated by L = ˆ L − L1 since
the project is of positive NPV, and by choosing L = ˆ L − L1, the possibility of the loss of B is still
eliminated. L > L0 is not possible since the ﬁrm does not request more than L0 units from the
30bank.
From the ﬁrst part of the proposition, we need only focus on two potential levels of investment
to address the second part: L = ˆ L − L1 and L = L0. First, consider the case in which the bank






(1 − ph)R0(ˆ L − L1) +
1
2
(1 − pl)R0(ˆ L − L1) + q(1 − pN)L1R1 (13)




(1 − ph)R0L0 +
1
2
(1 − pl)R0L0 + q(1 − pN)L1R1 −
1
2
q(ph + pl)pNB (14)
Comparing (13) and (14) we derive the condition in which full initial investment takes place:
L0 − (ˆ L − L1) ≥
BqpN(ph + pl)
R0[(1 − ph) + (1 − pl)]
(15)
Note that if L0−(ˆ L−L1) <
BqpN(ph+pl)
R0[(1−ph)+(1−pl)], then the bank under-invests in the initial loan and
pursues the new loan. Next, consider the case where B >
RAL2(1−pN)
pNph . In this case, the bank can
either have full investment in the initial loan and does not pursue the new loan, or can under-invest
in the initial loan, and fully pursue the new loan. The payoﬀ to under-investing is given in (13)




(1 − ph)R0L0 +
1
2
(1 − pl)R0L0 (16)
Comparing (13) and (16), we obtain the following condition for full investment:
L0 − (ˆ L − L1) ≥
2q(1 − pN)L1R1
R0[(1 − ph) + (1 − pl)]




pNpl ]. If the banks invests fully at time t = 0, then,
conditional on the new investment being available, the bank will invest in it only if it is revealed
that the initial loan is of high quality. The payoﬀ to under-investment is given is (13), while the




(1 − ph)R0L0 +
1
2
(1 − pl)R0L0 +
1
2
(q(1 − pN)L1R1 − BpNpl) (17)
Comparing (13) and (17), we obtain the following condition for full investment:
L0 − (ˆ L − L1) ≥
q(1 − pN)L1R1 − BpNpl
R0[(1 − ph) + (1 − pl)]
Proof of Proposition 1
Comparing (13) and (3), we can see that the existence of either one of the CRT instruments
solves the under-investment problem that can occur if (15) is not satisﬁed.
We give the expected, ex-ante proﬁts of a bank that does not pursue the new investment in
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(1 − ph)R0L0 +
1
2
(1 − pl)R0L0 +
1
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Comparing (18), (19) and (20) with (3), we see that CRT also ensures that the new investment
will be fully pursued. Since this is not the case without CRT, and these projects are of positive
net present value, we conclude that CRT induces the optimal investment level. This is because
under-investment involves leaving a portion of the project unfunded, and forcing it to proceed on
a smaller scale. Comparing the expected proﬁt from full investment under CRT and no CRT, we
immediately see that the use of CRT is always more proﬁtable for the bank.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, consider the separating equilibrium where the high types chose sales, and the low types chose
insurance. The zero proﬁt condition tells us that PS = 1 − ph and PI = pl. The participation
32constraint in the state {L,NONEW}: (PC1) can be written as:
(1 − pl)R0L0 − RfplL0 + plL0 − (Rf − 1)L0 ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 − (Rf − 1)L0
⇒ Rf ≤ 1
Since Rf > 1, (PC1) will never be satisﬁed.
Next, consider the separating equilibrium where the high types chose to insure, and the low
types chose to sell. The zero proﬁt condition tells us that PS = 1−pl and PI = ph. The participation
constraint in the state {L,NONEW} (PC1) can be written as:
α(1 − pl)R0L0 − (Rf − 1)L ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0 − (Rf − 1)L0
⇒ α ≥ 1
Since α < 1, (PC1) will never be satisﬁed.
Any equilibria where either type is indiﬀerent between loan sales and loan insurance will yield
either one of the two previous cases and can be ruled out.
Proof of Lemma 3
There are two cases that we need to consider since the binding constraint will depend on the
parameters of the model.
The ﬁrst condition is derived assuming that (I-PC1) is the binding constraint. We then put the
necessary restriction on (I-IC2) to make (I-PC1) bind.








The second condition assume (I-IC2) binds. We put the necessary restriction on Rf from









Proof of Lemma 4
There are three cases that we need to consider since the binding constraint will depend on the
parameters of the model.
The ﬁrst condition is derived assuming that (S-PC1) is the binding constraint. We ﬁnd the
range of Rf such that the R.H.S of (S-IC1b) and (S-IC2b) are less than
1−pl
PS .














R0(1 − ph) + ph
(1 − pl)R0 + PI
The second condition assumes that (S-IC2b) binds. The condition on Rf allows the R.H.S of (S-
IC2b) to be less than
1−pl
PS . The second condition results because for (S-IC2b) to bind, the R.H.S
of (S-IC2b) must be greater than the R.H.S of (S-IC1b).






R0(1 − ph) + ph
(1 − pl)R0 + PI
To obtain a lower bound on Rf, we need to make sure that the value or Rf is not so low as to
34require α > 1. To this we compute:




R0(1 − ph) + ph
PI + R0PS
.
The third condition assumes that (S-IC1b) binds. The condition on Rf allows the R.H.S of
(S-IC1b) to be less than
1−pl
PS . The second condition results because for (S-IC1b) to bind, the R.H.S
of (S-IC1b) must be greater than the R.H.S of (S-IC2b).








To obtain a lower bound on Rf, we need to make sure that the value or Rf is not so low as to
require α > 1. To this we compute:




R0(1 − pl) + pl − R0PS
PI
.
Proof of Lemma 5
Plugging in PS = 1 − PI into (I-IC1a), (S-IC1b) and (S-IC2b). If (S-IC1b) is the
binding constraint for the sales equilibrium, then the set S (α|(I-IC1a) ∩ (S-IC1b)) is empty.
This implies that sales and insurance are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, we can see
that in this case, either of the two cases must occur. If (S-IC2b) is the binding con-














is non-empty so that neither the insurance nor
sales equilibrium exists. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the insurance and sales equilibrium
cannot co-exist in this case.
357.2 Appendix B
Consider a bank with access to an unveriﬁable monitoring technology at time t = 1 that has a
cost, e. Let us assume that without this monitoring, all low quality loans will fail with probability
1.27 Consider the case in which there is no CRT available. To ensure that the bank wishes to
monitor, the following condition must hold:
e ≤ R0L0(1 − pl)
Next, consider the case of loan insurance. There is a trade-oﬀ present with this new monitoring
technology. The bank can choose not to monitor, but give up the potential return from the low
quality loans.28 We can put the following assumption on e to ensure that they wish to continue
monitoring in the low state when they insure their loan.
R0L0(1 − pl) + plL0 − e ≥ L0
⇒ e ≤ (R0 − 1)(1 − pl)
Finally, if the bank wishes to use loan sales, it can never credibly commit to monitoring the bad loans
for any e > 0. Therefore, the price of the loan sale will simply be R0L0[1−Prob(Default|sales)] =
R0L0[1−
1+qph
q+1 ]. We can see immediately that this new loan sales price is smaller than the original
price without moral hazard. We therefore use the exogenous variable α to represent the amount
that the loan sale price is reduced with moral hazard present.29 Intuitively, if α < 1, all else equal,
the bank may not wish to use loan sales and the market may not exist. For example, consider the
participation constrain in the state {L,NONEW} of the sales equilibrium:
αPSR0L0 ≥ (1 − pl)R0L0
27The qualitative results follow through if we make the assumption that bank monitoring can transform low quality
loans into high quality loans.
28If the bank chooses to not monitor the bad loans we know that Prob(Default) =
1+qph
q+1 .
29Gorton and Pennachhi (1995) and DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999) show that if the bank retains a portion of the loan
(usually ﬁrst-loss), the moral hazard can be lowered. A modern example is that of a Collateralized Loan Obligation
(CLO). We will not consider tranching in this paper.
36It follows that if α <
1−pl
PS , the participation constraint can never be satisﬁed, and therefore they
will not sell their loan in this state.
7.3 Appendix C
We now consider the resulting equilibrium when moral hazard, relationship management and
costly capital are added to the analysis. We begin the analysis by redeﬁning the parameter space
of interest. We turn to the state {H,NONEW} ﬁrst.
πNI = R0(1 − ph)L0 − (Rf − 1)L0
πI = R0(1 − ph)L0 + phL0 − (Rf − 1)L0 − RfL0PI
It follows that for πNI ≥ πI, the condition PI ≥
ph
Rf must be added to the optimal contracting
problem as (I-Bound). We now analyze {H,NEW} to see under what condition they will use loan
insurance.
πNI = R0(1 − ph)L0 − (Rf − 1)L0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − pNphB − (Rf − 1)L1
πI = R(1 − ph)L0 + phL0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − (Rf − 1)L0 − RfPIL0 − (Rf − 1)L1





Therefore, (21) gives us the parameter bound on B. To ﬁnd a similar bound for loan sales, we begin
by looking at {H,NONEW}.
πNS = R0(1 − ph)L0 − (Rf − 1)L0
πS = αR0(PS)L0 − (Rf − 1)L0
For πNS ≥ πS, we will add αPS ≤ 1 − ph to our optimal contracting problem as (S-Bound). We
37now analyze {H,NEW} to see under what condition they will use loan sales:
πNS = R0L0(1 − ph) − (Rf − 1)L0 + (1 − pN)L1R1 − (Rf − 1)L1 − phpNB
πS = αR0L0(PS) + (1 − pN)L1R1 − (Rf − 1)L0 − (Rf − 1)[L1 − αR0PSL0]
From above, for πS ≥ πNS, the following must hold:
B ≥
R0L0((1 − ph) − αPSRf)
pNph
(22)
The parametrization that characterizes loan sales is given by (22).
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40Figure 1: Growth in Credit Derivatives









Notional Value of Credit Derivatives (in Trillions $)
Source − ISDA 2005
Figure 2: Average weekly trading volume (per institution) of three common types of derivatives
Instrument 2003 2004 2005
Currency Options 427 559 905
Equity Derivatives - Vanilla 291 153 153
Credit Derivatives 79 103 206
Source - ISDA 2005 Operations Benchmark Survey
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